Temporal contingency by Gallistel, C. R. et al.
Please cite this article in press as: Gallistel, C.R., et al., Temporal contingency. Behav. Process. (2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2013.08.012
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelBEPROC-2700; No. of Pages 8
Behavioural Processes xxx (2013) xxx– xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Behavioural  Processes
jou rn al h om epa ge: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /behavproc
Temporal  contingency
C.R.  Gallistel a,,  Andrew  R.  Craigb, Timothy  A.  Shahanb
a Department of Psychology and Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, 152 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854, United States
b Department of Psychology, Utah State University, 2810 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322, United States
a  r  t  i  c  l  e  i n  f  o
Article history:
Received 16 July 2013
Received in revised form 19 August 2013
Accepted 21 August 2013
Keywords:
Operant conditioning
Classical conditioning
Timing
Information theory
Temporal pairing
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Contingency,  and  more  particularly  temporal  contingency,  has  often  figured  in  thinking  about  the  nature
of learning.  However,  it has never  been  formally  defined  in  such  a way as to  make  it  a  measure that can  be
applied  to most  animal  learning  protocols.  We  use  elementary  information  theory  to define contingency
in  such  a way  as  to make  it a measurable  property  of  almost  any  conditioning  protocol.  We  discuss  how
making  it  a measurable  construct  enables  the exploration  of the role  of different  contingencies  in the
acquisition  and  performance  of classically  and  operantly  conditioned  behavior.
This  article  is  part  of a Special  Issue  entitled:  Associative  and  Temporal  Learning.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The concept of contingency has long been a shadowy presence
in theoretically oriented discussions of classical (i.e., Pavlovian)
and operant conditioning. In the operant-conditioning literature,
many authors have observed that operant conditioning depends
on the reward, or desired state of affairs being delivered contin-
gent on a response of some particular kind (see Skinner, 1938;
Thorndike, 1932). Similarly, in the Pavlovian-conditioning litera-
ture, many authors have observed that a classically conditioned
response (CR) develops when the occurrence of the unconditioned
stimulus (US; i.e., a reinforcer) is contingent on (conditioned on)
the occurrence of the conditioned stimulus (CS; see Pavlov, 1927;
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Its presence is, however, shadowy,
because it has never been defined in such a way as to be gen-
erally useable; in consequence of which, it has never been a
measurable aspect of most conditioning protocols and/or of the
behavior-events relations that emerge when animals are exposed
to conditioning protocols.
For the most part, contingency has been taken to be reducible to
temporal pairing. Skinner (1948, p. 168) expressed a common con-
viction when he wrote: “To say that a reinforcement is contingent
upon a response may  mean nothing more than that it follows the
response. It may  follow because of some mechanical connection
or because of the mediation of another organism; but condition-
ing takes place presumably because of the temporal relation only,
expressed in terms of the order and proximity of response and
reinforcement.” Rescorla (1967) gives a lengthy discussion of the
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issue of temporal pairing versus contingency from a  theoretical and
historical perspective.
The attraction of treating contingency as reducible to temporal
pairing is that there should not be in principle a problem with
operationalizing the concept of temporal pairing. Events are
temporally paired if and only if they consistently occur together
within some critical interval. Thus, we  should be able to operational-
ize the concept of temporal pairing by determining empirically
what the critical interval is and how consistently (i.e., with what
probability) the times of occurrences of the two events have to
fall within that interval in order for the brain (of some species)
to treat them as temporally paired. In the event, however, a
century of experimental work on simple associative learning
has failed to determine the critical interval for any two  events
in any species in any classical- or operant-conditioning protocol
(Rescorla, 1972; Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000). The concept of
temporal pairing has eluded empirical definition. A fortiori, there
has been no determination of what constitutes consistent temporal
pairing.
The importance of distinguishing between contingency and
temporal pairing was  made clear by Rescorla’s experiments with a
truly random control (Rescorla, 1968; see Fig. 1). In this experiment,
Rescorla showed that contingency was not reducible to temporal
pairing and that, when one tested whether it was  temporal pairing
or contingency that led to the emergence of conditioned responding
in a Pavlovian conditioning protocol, it was contingency and not
temporal pairing. This well known experiment did not, however,
succeed in bringing the concept of contingency out of the theo-
retical shadows, because it continued to be a nebulous, undefined
concept. If it was  not temporal pairing, what was  it? Could it be
measured?
0376-6357/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2013.08.012
Please cite this article in press as: Gallistel, C.R., et al., Temporal contingency. Behav. Process. (2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2013.08.012
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelBEPROC-2700; No. of Pages 8
2 C.R. Gallistel et al. / Behavioural Processes xxx (2013) xxx– xxx
USCSContinge nt
    lCS> lC
Truly  Random
       lCS= lC
t
t
ITIT
lCS =2/(3 T)
lCS =2/(3 T)
lC=2/t
lC=11/t
0
0
Fig. 1. Schematic of Rescorla (1968) experiment distinguishing CS–US pairing from CS–US contingency. The temporal pairing of CS and US is the same in both conditions,
but  there is a CS–US contingency in the top protocol and none in the bottom protocol. Rats developed a conditioned response to the CS only when run in the top protocol.
What many researchers, including Rescorla, took away from
Rescorla’s experiment was that contingency in Pavlovian condi-
tioning was p(R|CS)/p(R), where R denotes reinforcement and CS
the presence of a conditioned stimulus. In words, contingency
is the probability of reinforcement given the conditioned stim-
ulus divided by the unconditional probability of reinforcement.
This notional definition is readily extended to the operant case
by writing p(R|r)/p(R), where r denotes a response. The prob-
lem with this conclusion is that it takes no account of time;
hence, both the unconditional and the conditional probabilities are
undefined.
To see the problem, one need only ask what the uncondi-
tional probability of reinforcement was in Rescorla’s experiment,
or, for that matter, what the conditional probability was. Although
Rescorla’s experiment has generally been discussed in terms of
the differential probability of reinforcement, what Rescorla in fact
did was vary the rate parameter of a Poisson (random rate) pro-
cess as a function of whether the conditioned stimulus was  or was
not present. Rate, unlike, probability, has a temporal dimension;
it is number per unit time. Rates can be converted to probabilities
only by integration—integration over some interval—and the result
depends on the interval. Thus, the question, what is the probabil-
ity of reinforcement given some random rate? is ill posed; it has
no answer. One can ask what the probability is that reinforcement
will occur within some interval, for example within one of the 2-
min  intervals during which the conditioned stimulus in Rescorla’s
experiment was present. However, even this question is not well
posed, because it does not specify what we understand by ‘the
occurrence of reinforcement’: Does it matter how many reinforcers
occur within the specified interval? Are two or even three shocks
during one CS presentation to be regarded as no different from only
one shock? The same indeterminancies arise when we  attempt to
apply the above intuitive definition of contingency to the operant
case.
Intuitively, contingency is closely related to correlation. How-
ever, the conventional measures of correlation assume that
co-occurrence, that is, the pairing of x and y observations has
already been determined; the only question is whether variation
in the x values predict variation in the y values with which they are
paired.
Measures of contingency in the psychological literature are
derived from 2  2 contingency table (Table 1). Several have
been used, but only two have suitable mathematical proper-
ties, such as ranging from 0 to 1 and not depending on the
number of observations (for a review, see Gibbon et al., 1974).
Both of these are properties of the correlation coefficient, but
that measure cannot be computed for dichotomous variables.
Table 1
2  2 contingency table.
#USs #USs Row totals
#CSs: a b a + b
#CSs: c d c + d
Col  totals: a + c b + d
For dichotomous variables, Pearson’s mean square coefficient of
contingency
 =
p
2/N =
r
(ad  bc)2
(a + b) (c + d) (a + c) + (b + d)
is recommended by Gibbon et al. (1974) and others, while the dif-
ference in the conditional probabilities of the US,
1P = p(US|CS)  p(US|CS) = a
a + b
c
c + d
has been used extensively in studies of human contingency and
causality judgment (see, for example Allan et al., 2008).
There is, however, no unproblematic way  to construct a contin-
gency table in Pavlovian conditioning experiments, because they do
not reliably have an empirically definable trial structure (Gallistel
and Gibbon, 2000). The problem comes into strong relief when one
considers how to construct the contingency table for Rescorla’s
(1968) experiment schematized in Fig. 1. In that experiment, the CS
lasted 2 min  each time it occurred. The intervals between CS offsets
and CS onsets varied around an average of 10 min. There is no doubt
about how many CSs and USs there were, nor whether a given US
occurred while the CS was present, so the first cell (a in Table 1) is
no problem. All the other cells are problematic, because there is no
objectively justifiable answer to the question, “How many not-USs
and how many not-CSs were there and when did they occur?”
One approach to dealing with this problem is to suppose that the
brain divides continuous time into a continual sequence of discrete
“trials.” This is what Rescorla and Wagner (1972) assumed in their
analysis of the experiment by Rescorla (1968) schematized in Fig. 1.
They assumed that the protocol in Fig. 1 could be treated as con-
sisting of a sequence of 2-min-long pseudo-trials, one immediately
succeeding the other. During each pseudo-trial a US either occurred
or it did not occur, and likewise for a CS. Thus, for example, if dur-
ing one such fictitious trial, neither a US nor a CS occurred, then,
for the purpose of constructing a contingency table, this would
count as a “trial” on which one CS and one US occurred. They
do not say how they scored pseudo-trials on which more than one
US occurred.
The problem with this approach is obvious. It is impossible to
say how often something does not occur. It is impossible to say,
for example, how many not earthquakes London experienced in
the year just passed. Without objectively defined trials, USs and
CSs have no objectively definable relative frequency. This prob-
lem is even more acute in the case of operant conditioning, because
in those protocols, there are often no trials of any kind, in the
sense in which ‘trial’ is understood in the literature on classical
conditioning. Thus, for example, it is impossible to say how many
not-reinforcers occurred during an inter-reinforcement interval in
an operant conditioning protocol.
A second problem with measures based on a contingency table,
and with the correlation coefficient as well, is that they take no
account of time. They do not do so, because they assume that the
pairing of two  events—which instances of one event are paired with
which instances of the other—has already been determined. The
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contingencies of ordinary experience, however, are defined over
time, and the temporal intervals between the events are centrally
relevant to the psychological perception of contingency and causal-
ity. A psychologically useful measure of contingency must take into
account the intervals between events.
The cross-correlation function does take time into account. It
computes the correlation between two events as a function of the
displacement in time of one event record relative to that of the
other. Its computation, however, presupposes that time can be
divided into discrete bins, because the two records are stepped
relative to one another bin by bin, and the computation of the corre-
lation coefficient at any given step treats the events in aligned bins
as co-occurrences (i.e., x–y pairs). The results of a cross-correlation
computation depend strongly on the choice of bin widths. To apply
this to the analysis of contingency in conditioning paradigms, one
would need to know the brain’s temporal bin widths. Knowing
this is analogous to knowing what the brain regards as “close” in
time; two events are “close” or “contiguous” or “concurrent” just in
case they fall within the same time bin. As already noted, attempts
to determine experimentally how wide such a bin might be have
failed.
What is needed for contingency to emerge from the theoreti-
cal shadows is a definition that: (1) makes it measurable; (2) takes
time into account; (3) can be applied to any kind of suggested con-
tingency; and (4) does not depend fundamentally on an arbitrary
discretization of continuous time (time bins). Information theory
provides such a definition.
1. An information-theoretic definition of temporal
contingency
Information (aka entropy) is a computable property of a prob-
ability distribution, just like its mean or its variance. A probability
distribution associates probabilities or probability densities with
the possible values for some variable. The possible values are called
the support for the distribution. The entropy of the distribution,
denoted H, is the probability of each possible value times the loga-
rithm of its inverse:
H =
X
i
pi log
 1
pi

,
where i indexes the possible values of the support for the distribu-
tion.
When only one value is possible, the associated probability is
1, and the “distribution” has 0 entropy. In such a case, there is
no information to be gained about the value of the support vari-
able. The information available from that source is therefore 0. The
more values a variable can assume and the more nearly equal their
relative frequency, the greater the entropy of the probability dis-
tribution; hence, the more information there is to be gained from
learning the current value of the support variable.
Events convey information about one another to the extent
that knowledge of one event reduces our uncertainty about the
other. This is Shannon’s (1948) definition of the amount of infor-
mation that the signal events processed by a receiver convey about
a source variable. The receiver’s average information gain from the
signal events is measured by the difference in entropy between
the receiver’s probability distribution on the source variable in the
absence of the signal and its probability distribution in the pres-
ence of the signal. The entropy of the former measures the receiver’s
uncertainty in the absence of a signal. This entropy is the upper limit
on how much information the receiver can gain about that source.
We will call this the basal entropy and denote it by Hb. We call the
entropy of the receiver’s distribution given the signal the residual
entropy and denote it by Hr. The proposed information-theoretic
measure of contingency is:
C = (Hb  Hr)
Hb
.
Consider, for example, pellets that are released into a  feed-
ing hopper by an approximation to a Poisson (random rate)
process, with rate parameter, . The distribution of inter-pellet
intervals is exponential with expectation  = 1/. Its entropy is
k log(1/) = k log(), where k is a scaling factor whose value is
determined by the temporal resolution. This resolution-dependent
scaling factor cancels out of the contingency measure, because it
appears in both the numerator and the denominator, so we  drop
it from here on. The entropy of the inter-pellet interval (IPI) distri-
bution is an example of a basal entropy. This entropy is commonly
called the available information or the source information. It  meas-
ures the uncertainty about when to expect the next pellet, in the
absence of any other events that convey information about the
timing of pellet release, including previous pellet releases.
Suppose, now, that there are such other events. Suppose, for
example, that a brief tone precedes every pellet release by 1 s.  The
distribution of intervals from tone onset to pellet release has no
entropy, because there is only one such interval. The objective
contingency between tone onset and pellet release—the contin-
gency for an observer with perfect timing—is 1, because for such
an observer, the residual entropy is 0, so
C = (log(1/)   0)
log(1/)
=  1
For an animal observer, the residual entropy is not 0,
because brains represent temporal intervals with scalar uncer-
tainty (Gibbon, 1977; Killeen and Weiss, 1987). Thus, we may  take
the residual entropy to be the entropy of a normal distribution1
whose standard deviation is proportional to the duration, d:
Hr = Hn(d, w) = .5 log(2ewd),
where w is the temporal Weber fraction and Hn(d, w) denotes the
entropy of a normal distribution with mean d and coefficient of
variation, w.  Because the Weber fraction, w, is small (on the order
of .16; Gallistel et al., 2004), the residual subjective entropy is small.
For a fixed residual subjective entropy, the subjective contingency
between CS and US depends on the expected interval between pel-
lets; the larger the IPI,  the stronger this subjective contingency is.
Assuming w = 0.16 and an expected IPI of 10 s (and a  tone-release
interval of 1 s), the subjective tone-release contingency is 0.78. If
we increase the expected IPI to 100 s, the tone-release contingency
is 0.89. As the basal entropy, which appears in both the numerator
and the denominator, becomes arbitrarily large, the contingency
ratio becomes arbitrarily close to 1.
Suppose, now, that the experimental protocol schedules tones
using a Poisson process with rate parameter , but on each
tone “trial” it releases pellets with probability p(R|CS). In tra-
ditional parlance, we partially reinforce the tone. Doing so
lengthens the expected IPI by 1/p(R|CS)—see Fig. 2. This increases
by log(1/p(R|CS)) = log(p(R|CS)) the basal uncertainty, Hb, about
when the next pellet release will occur, which uncertainty is
the denominator of the contingency ratio. Partial reinforcement
increases the residual uncertainty, Hr, as well, which is the other
term in the numerator of the contingency ratio. It does so because
it introduces uncertainty about whether a pellet will be released
at the conclusion of any given tone occurrence. The uncertainty
1 Technically, the left tail of the normal distribution extends to negative infinity.
A  more mathematically rigorous approach would use a distribution supported only
on the positive reals, for example, the gamma  distribution.
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Fig. 2. Partial reinforcement of a random fraction of the CS presentations lengthens
the  average interval between pellets, hIPIi, by the reciprocal of the partial reinforce-
ment fraction, that is, by 1/p(R|CS). This increases the basal entropy, the denominator
of the contingency ratio, but it has no effect on the numerator of that ratio, which
is  the information about when to expect the US that the onset of the CS conveys.
When to expect the US is altered only by whether the US will occur during this CS
presentation. That source of uncertainty is independent of the uncertainty about
when the US will occur if it occurs during this presentation, so the two  entropies
(the whether and when measures of uncertainty) combine additively (see Eq. (1)).
about whether a pellet release will occur following a tone is inde-
pendent of the uncertainty attendant on the application of the
Weber fraction to the fixed delay between tone onset and pellet
release. The entropies from independently distributed sources of
uncertainty are additive. Therefore, the residual subjective entropy
is the entropy of the normally distributed subjective uncertainty
about when exactly pellet release will occur following tone onset,
if it does occur on this presentation, plus the entropy of the
distribution of trials-to-pellet release. This latter distribution is
geometric with parameter p(R|CS)—see Fig. 3. The entropy of a
geometric distribution is log(1/p(R|CS)). Thus, when we  apply the
information-theoretic measure of contingency, we have:
CUS,CS = Hb + log(1/p(R|CS))  (Hn + log(1/p(R|CS)))Hb + log(1/p)
= Hb  Hn
Hb + log(1/p(R|CS))
(1)
We  see from Eq. (1) that partial reinforcement increases the
denominator of the contingency ratio by log(1/p(R|CS)) while hav-
ing no effect on the numerator. Therefore, partial reinforcement
reduces the tone-pellet contingency, as one would expect.
The numerator in Eq. (1), which is unaffected by the partial
reinforcement, is the information about US timing conveyed by
the onset of a conditioned stimulus. Thus, partial reinforcement
degrades the contingency between the conditioned stimulus and
the unconditioned stimulus, but it does not diminish the informa-
tion about US timing conveyed by the onset of a CS. Surprisingly,
partial reinforcement has little or no effect on the number of rein-
forced presentations of the conditioned stimulus required for the
appearance of a conditioned response (Williams, 1981; Gottlieb,
2004; Harris et al., 2011; Harris, 2011). Thus, it would appear that
what matters for the acquisition of a conditioned response in a
0 20 40
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Trials to next R Trials to next R
p
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Fig. 3. Geometric distributions for two different partial reinforcement schedules.
A  geometric distribution associates with successive future trials (e.g., future tones)
the discrete probability that reinforcement will occur on that trial. The entropy of a
geometric distribution is log(1/p(R)), where p(R) is the probability of a reinforcer on
any  given trial. Note that 1/p(R) is the expected number of trials to a reinforcer, just
as 1/ is the expected interval to the next reinforcer in a variable–interval protocol.
The formula for the entropy of a geometric distribution is very similar to the formula
for  the entropy of an exponential distribution because the geometric distribution is
the  discrete approximation to the exponential distribution.
Pavlovian paradigm is not the CS–US contingency but rather how
informative the onset of the CS is about how soon to expect the US
(Balsam and Gallistel, 2009).
So far, we have considered only predictive contingency, but
there are reasons to consider also retrospective contingency. We
will want to do so most particularly when we come to consider the
assignment of credit problem in operant conditioning (Staddon and
Zhang, 1991). This is the problem of computing what one did that
produced the reinforcer that has just been delivered. We introduce
the concept of retrospective contingency here, because the predic-
tive tone-pellet contingency is not the same as the retrospective
pellet-tone contingency. When we consider the retrospective con-
tingency, the basal entropy is the entropy of the intervals looking
backward from one tone to the preceding tone (rather than for-
ward from one pellet release to the next release). The distribution
of these retrospective inter-tone-intervals (ITI’s) is the same as that
of the IPI’s; it is exponential with parameter . Therefore, the basal
entropy in the denominator of the retrospective contingency ratio
is the same as in the denominator of the prospective contingency
ratio already considered. The numerator, though, is another story.
When we come to consider how well pellet releases retrodict tones,
the distribution we  consider in computing the residual entropy is
the distribution of intervals looking backward from pellet releases
to the first preceding tone. The distribution of these intervals has no
entropy, regardless of the value of the partial reinforcement param-
eter, p(R|CS), because a tone invariably precedes every pellet release
by 1 s.
By developing a measure of contingency, we  have deepened and
refined our understanding of what we might mean by it. To our
knowledge, in discussing the contingency between events A and
B (say, between CS and US events), no one previously has distin-
guished between the predictive contingency and the retrospective
contingency. Because time was  not present in previous conceptions
of contingency, the distinction between prediction and retrodiction
could not be made. This distinction becomes even more central
when we  turn to operant conditioning, as we  now do.
Consider a pigeon pecking a key on a variable-interval (VI)
schedule. On this schedule, the duration of the interval from one
reinforcer to the next (denoted IRI) is approximately exponentially
distributed. The inter-response intervals (iri’s) are much shorter
than the IRI’s, so most responses (i.e., pecks) do not bring up the
grain hopper. Every now and then, however, a peck does bring it
up, with a very short fixed delay (.01 s). We  pose the question, what
is the response–reinforcement contingency in this protocol? We
show that there are different ways to define it, depending on what
one imagines is relevant to the observed behavior. The information-
theoretic formula applies to each different way  of defining it, giving
us several different contingency measures. Thus, one can ask which
measures, if any, predict the observed behavior. In this way, we
address quantitatively the role of contingency in operant behavior.
The first contingency is the same as the one we first considered
in discussing the prospective contingency between a CS (the tone)
and a US (pellet release) in classical conditioning, only we replace CS
onset times with response times. The basal entropy in the denom-
inator of the contingency ratio is the entropy of the distribution of
IRI’s (inter-reinforcer intervals). The residual entropy is the entropy
of the distribution of r!R intervals (response-reinforcer intervals),
where r denotes the time at which a response occurs and R the time
at which the next reinforcer occurs.
For the r!R distribution, we  go through the data peck by peck.
We find for each peck the interval to the next reinforcer, ignor-
ing any intervening pecks. We  make a histogram of these intervals,
normalize the counts to obtain an empirical discrete probability
distribution, and apply Shannon’s formula bin by bin. To obtain
a comparable empirical distribution for the basal entropy in the
denominator, we take the record of reinforcement times, sprinkle
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Fig. 4. Representative empirical distributions of r!R (peck time!reinforcer time)
and  t!R (random time!reinforcer time) intervals for one bird responding on VI
schedules of reinforcement. Top row: VI 30 s. Middle row: 165 s. Bottom row: VI
300  s. The bin width in these histograms, for a given VI, is the same for both the r!R
and the t!R distribution. It appears as a scale factor in both the numerator and the
denominator of the contingency ratio. Therefore, it does not affect the contingency
ratio (in the limit as the data sample gets large enough to put several counts in the
bin  with the fewest counts, as is the case in these normalized histograms).
on the time line as many random points as there were pecks, and
find for each randomly chosen point in time the interval to the next
reinforcer. From this tabulation we get an empirical probability dis-
tribution with the same bin widths as the empirical distribution of
r!R intervals. We  call these t!R distributions, where t denotes a
randomly chosen moment in time.
In the Shahan lab, we ran 8 pigeons on VI schedules with
expected intervals of 30, 165, and 300 s, for 10 sessions at each
expected interval. Representative r!R and t!R distributions from
this experiment are shown in Fig. 4. Over an order of magnitude
variation in VI, the r!R distribution is almost indistinguishable
from the t!R distribution, which means that there is no prospec-
tive contingency between response and reinforcer delivery in a
VI schedule of reinforcement. The residual entropies, which is to
say the entropies of the r!R distributions, are the same as the
basal entropies (the entropies of the t!R distributions). Thus, the
numerators of the contingency ratios are 0, and the contingencies
themselves are therefore 0.
The question arises: If there is no measurable prospective con-
tingency between pecks and reinforcement—that is, if making a
peck does not alter by any measurable amount the probability of
reinforcement at any particular time in the future—then why  do
the birds peck? One possible answer is that there is a contingency
between rate of pecking and rate of reinforcement. If pecking were
very slow, so that the average inter-peck interval was  much longer
than the expectation of the VI schedule, then there certainly would
be such a contingency, because almost every peck would produce
a reinforcer; therefore, as the rate of pecking increased, so would
the rate of reinforcement.
To estimate this contingency, we consider the joint distribution
between the iri’s  and the IRI’s. The support for a joint distribution
is the set of all possible combinations of values for two variables. In
this case, every IRI yields such a combination, because one can asso-
ciate with every IRI a mean iri,  namely the average interval between
responses during the interval from the preceding reinforcer to the
current reinforcer. We  denote the average inter-response inter-
val during an IRI by hirii  Empirically, for every reinforcer, we note
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Fig. 5. Representative joint distributions of Inter-Reinforcement Interval durations
(IRI)  and their associated mean inter-response intervals, hirii, from one bird respon-
ding for several sessions each on 3 different Variable Interval (VI) schedules, plotted
against linear axes. The discrete character of the IRI’s arises from the way the VI
schedules were implemented: The interval to the setting up of the next reinforcer
was drawn from a uniform discrete probability distribution on a set of 10 inter-
vals with equal logarithmic separations. The first peck after this interval elapsed
delivered the reinforcer.
the interval elapsed since the previous reinforcer, and we note the
number of pecks, np, that occurred during that interval. The hirii
associated with that IRI is the IRI/np. This analysis of the record of
peck and reinforcement times produces a (non-arbitrary) pairing
of IRI’s and hiri i ’ s. The shorter the hirii, the faster the bird pecked
during that IRI. Fig. 5 shows the three joint distributions for a  repre-
sentative bird when plotted against linear axes, while Fig. 6 shows
them when plotted against log–log axes.
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Fig. 6. Same data as in Fig. 5, plotted against double logarithmic axes. The dashed
diagonal line in the upper-left panel separates a portion that shows a strong prospec-
tive contingency between the mean iri and the IRI (below the line) from a portion
that shows only weak contingency. This portion is largely missing from the upper
right panel and missing altogether from the lower panel. Note that the locations of
the IRI streaks move up as the VI-schedule parameter increases, whereas the location
of  the high density of mean iri’s remains roughly constant.
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Fig. 7. Data from the VI(30) condition showing both the scatter plot (the empirical
joint distribution) and the two histograms (the empirical marginal distributions).
The information-theoretic measure of contingency tells us the
extent to which the uncertainty in a conditional distribution differs
from the uncertainty in an unconditional distribution. So far, the
unconditional entropy has been the entropy of the distribution of
intervals from randomly chosen points in time to the reinforcer (or
response) first encountered as one looks forward (or backward) in
time from that randomly chosen point. The conditional entropy has
been that of the distribution of intervals looking forward or back-
ward in time from either a response or a reinforcer. The points in
time from which one looks forward or backward have no duration;
that is, they are not themselves random variables. By contrast, both
the intervals between reinforcers, the IRI’s, and the mean intervals
between responses within an IRI, that is, the hiri i ’ s, are both ran-
dom variables. When we  ask to what extent the IRI is contingent
on the hirii, we ask whether the distributions of IRI’s conditioned
on the choice of smallish segments of the hirii  axis differ from the
unconditioned distribution of IRI’s; that is, does p(IRI
hiriii ) differ
noticeably in shape or location from p(IRI| h iri i j) for some choices
of i and j? The unconditional distribution of IRI’s, p(IRI), is called the
marginal distribution, because it is obtained by summing (or inte-
grating) the joint distribution along the hirii  axis. This summing or
integrating may  be thought of as a kind of bulldozer that runs par-
allel to the hirii axis and piles up probability against the margin of
the plot (Fig. 7).
One can form an approximate estimate of the contingency
between two associated random variables by inspecting their
scatter plot, that is, their joint distribution (Figs. 5 and 6). The
question is whether the extent to which the location or shape of
the distribution of points differs as one considers different verti-
cal or horizontal slices through the scatter plot. For example, does
the vertical location of the region where the points are densest
change noticeably from one vertical slice to another, and/or are the
points notably more dispersed in one slice than in another? For all
three plots in Fig. 5, the location of points and degree of dispersion
within different vertical slices are much the same. Thus, we  judge
by inspection that the contingency between rate of responding
(1/h iri i) and rate of reinforcement (1/IRI)  is weak.
The picture changes somewhat when we plot the same data
against log–log axes, as in Fig. 6. We  see in the upper left plot
a region (the region below the diagonal dashed line) in which
there is a striking contingency between log(IRI)  and logh iri i. In
this region, log(IRI)  increases as a linear function of logh iri i. This
occurs because on a VI 30-s schedule, the three shortest reinforcer-
arming intervals on the list from which the scheduling algorithm
chose at random were as short or shorter than the basal average
interval between responses. Whenever that happened, the actu-
ally experienced interval between reinforcers was dominated by
the interval between two responses, each of which produced a  rein-
forcer: Because reinforcers are in fact triggered by responses, the
interval between the two reinforcers whose time of occurrences
define an IRI can never be shorter than the average interval between
responses associated with that IRI. Put another way, the hirii asso-
ciated with an IRI can never be longer than the IRI, whereas the
reverse is not true; the hirii can be—and generally is—much smaller
than the IRI with which it is associated. This is what makes the
feedback function for VI schedules complex (Baum, 1992).
It could be that the bird’s brain processed its experiences of its
own  hiri i ’ s and the IRI’s in such a way  as to make the bird behav-
iorally sensitive to the contingency that is evident in a portion of
the joint distribution of log(IRI)’s and their associated log(hirii)’s.
This contingency, however, disappeared when we  lengthened the
VI (see the upper-right and lower plots in Fig. 6). If this contingency
were driving the pigeon’s responding, then we would expect this
manipulation to change responding substantially. In fact, however,
the manipulation of the VI has almost no effect: the marginal dis-
tributions of hiri i ’ s are very similar for all three plots, which means
that the average rate of responding and the within-session varia-
tion in rate of responding were little affected by a manipulation
that eliminated the low-end contingency between the hirii and its
associated IRI.
In  principle, the entropy of a joint distribution, Hj, is computed in
the same way as the entropy of a simple distribution; it is the prob-
ability of each possible combination times the log of the inverse of
that probability:
Hj =
X
i
X
j
pi,j log(1/pi,j)
The mutual information between the variables is:
Hxy = Hyx = Hx + Hy  Hj
and the degree to which the y variable is contingent on the x variable
is:
Cyx = HxyHy
In practice, the simple approach to estimating the entropy that
works reasonably well for obtaining an estimate of the information-
theoretic contingency from empirical distributions like those in
Fig. 4 cannot be used with empirical distributions like those in
Figs. 5–7. The distributions in Fig. 4 are histograms in which the
number of observations, N, is much larger than the number of bins,
m, in consequence of which, there are several counts in almost every
bin. Therefore, the bin-by-bin empirical probabilities (ni/N) are rea-
sonable approximations to the true probabilities. Therefore, it is
reasonable to apply Shannon’s entropy formula directly to these
empirical probabilities. The resulting estimates of the entropies are
inflated (biased) in a manner that depends on the N/m ratio; the
larger this ratio is, the less biased the estimate of the entropy is,
because the estimates of the true probabilities get better as this
ratio gets larger. However, the bias is the same for both of the
entropy estimates, Hb and Hr, that enter into the contingency ratio,
so it cancels out.
When it comes to joint distributions, like those in Figs. 5–7, one
needs a reasonable number of bins (at least 10) on each axis in order
to get a reasonable discrete approximation to the true continuous
distributions. Then, however, the total number of bins, m, is mx my
(the numbers of bins on each axis), which is to say a much larger
number of bins. If we used a minimum of 10 bins on each axis, the
total number of bins for the joint distribution would be 100, and
we only have N = 390 observations. Therefore, only a few of the 100
bins will have more than a few tallies, and many will have none. In
that case, the empirical relative frequencies in these 100 bins are no
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Fig. 8. Scatter plot of log hirii versus log(IRI)  with marginal histograms, for one bird
responding on a VI160s schedule. An estimate of the 2-dimensional joint probability
density function is shown by level curves (ovoid contour lines) superposed on the
scatter plot. The smooth curves superposed on the marginal histograms are the
suitably rescaled 1-dimensional integrals of this estimated joint probability density
function.
longer reasonable estimates of the true joint probabilities. How to
estimate the entropy under these circumstances has been studied
intensely in recent years (Paninski, 2003; Nemenman et al., 2004;
Paninski, 2004; Shwartz et al., 2005; Ho et al., 2010; Sricharan et al.,
2011).
Fig. 8 makes clear what the problem is. As in Fig. 7, it shows
the scatter plot for a joint distribution (from a bird responding on
VI160 schedule) and the histograms for the two marginal distri-
butions. In making this figure, we estimated the joint probability
density distribution using a more or less standard 2-dimensional
kernel smoothing operation. The resulting estimate is indicated by
the contour lines (level curves of the estimated probability den-
sity function) that are superimposed on the scatter plot. The curves
superimposed on the histograms are the estimates of the marginal
distributions obtained by integrating along the orthogonal dimen-
sions of the joint distribution. The unsatisfactoriness of the estimate
of the joint probability density function is evident in the discrep-
ancy between the histogram on the ordinate and the corresponding
integral of the estimated joint probability density function, that is,
between the observed marginal distribution (the histogram) and
the estimated marginal distribution (the smooth curve). Reason-
ably precise estimates of contingencies in these cases depend on
techniques for accurately estimating the joint distribution, because
the three entropies must be computed from the smooth estimates
of the three probability density distributions (the joint and the two
marginals). However, none of this prevents one noting from simple
inspection that this contingency is clearly weak.
We do not go into the issues surrounding techniques for esti-
mating joint distributions here; they are highly technical and we
do not pretend proficiency. Our proposed approach to measuring
temporal contingency in conditioning protocols will achieve its full
power only when the field settles on a demonstrably valid, gener-
ally applicable solution to the problem of estimating the entropies
of sparse empirical distributions.
Purely empirical work can also help. The more data one has, the
less problematic the estimation problem is, and operant methods
lend themselves to the gathering of really large data sets. Also, VI
schedules can now be implemented in ways that would remove
the artificial discontinuities in the log(IRI)  distribution evident in
Figs. 5–8.
To summarize so far, when birds respond on VI schedules, there
is a negligible prospective contingency between their responses
and reinforcer deliveries, because the distribution of the r!R inter-
vals, the intervals from a response to the next reinforcer, differs
very little from the distribution of t!R intervals, where the t’s are
randomly chosen points in time. Put most simply, having made
a response changes hardly at all the expectations regarding the
interval to the next reinforcer. By contrast with a fixed-ratio 1
(FR 1) schedule, where each response produces a reinforcer, there
is a perfect prospective contingency between a response and a
reinforcer delivery. This contingency gets gradually weaker as the
parameter of the FR schedule increases. When birds respond on
VI schedules, the contingency between their rate of responding
and the rate of reinforcement is also negligible. By contrast, with a
variable-ratio (VR) schedule, this contingency is strong, because
the faster they respond, the sooner on average a reinforcer is
delivered.
Another contingency that could be relevant to conditioned
behavior with VI protocols is the retrospective contingency
between reinforcers and immediately preceding responses, which
we denote as the r R contingency. The basal entropy for this
contingency is the distribution of intervals from randomly chosen
points in time backward to the immediately preceding response.
This distribution is very similar to—hence, has approximately
the same entropy as—the distribution of inter-response times.
(NB: This is not the same as the distribution of hiri i ’  s, which
are IRI/nr, where nr is the number of responses during the IRI.)
The residual entropy for this contingency is the entropy of the
distribution of intervals from reinforcers back to the immedi-
ately preceding response. The entropy of this distribution is 0,
because every reinforcer is preceded by a response at an unvary-
ing interval of 0.01 s. Thus, there is a perfect retrospective, r R,
contingency on a VI schedule. The same is true for all four ele-
mentary schedules of reinforcement [fixed interval (FI), VI, FR, and
VR]. In every case, reinforcers are triggered by some one of the
subject’s repeated responses. Whenever triggered, they occur at
a fixed very short delay after the triggering response. Therefore,
when one looks backward in time from reinforcer deliveries (R), one
always finds a preceding response (r) at the same short unvarying
remove.
Thus, the retrospective contingency between reinforcer and
response may  be an important variable in the emergence and
sustenance of operantly conditioned behavior. We  currently are
investigating this idea by manipulating this retrospective distribu-
tion in various ways. Clearly, it is not the only important variable,
because responding is, for example, much higher on a VR schedule
than on a VI schedule when the two schedules produce equiva-
lent rates of reinforcement (e.g., Lattal et al., 1989; Nevin et  al.,
2001). It does, however, seem plausible that the retrospective
r <  R contingency is an important variable, perhaps even a sine
qua non for the emergence of responding. If so, this will cap-
ture the intuition that operant conditioning differs in interesting
ways from classical/Pavlovian conditioning. The latter appears to
be driven primarily by the informativeness of the CS onset, that
is, by the relative shortening of the expected interval to reinforcer
delivery that occurs at CS onset (Balsam et al., 2006; Ward et al.,
2012).
It has long been imagined that in operant conditioning, the
reinforcer acts backward in time to stamp in a latent association
between the stimulus situation in which a response was made
and the response. Our analysis of contingency suggests that what
may  be correct about this idea is that the interval measured back-
ward from the reinforcer to the response may be a  key interval.
In any event, we  now have a powerful new tool for investigating
the issues about temporal pairing versus contingency that Rescorla
(1967) discussed almost half a century ago. We  have finally brought
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time into the picture in a manner that does not rely on some
indefensible artifice, such as the analytic imposition of pseudotrials,
the assumed durations of which are without empirical justification.
That is progress.
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